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No. 11, 2014
From January 2011 to early June 2013, I occasionally wrote 
in my blog about everyday life and politics in Egypt during 
a time of revolution. The final blog entry, written in the be-
ginning of June, told about the growing opposition against 
Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tamarod 
campaign, and the expectation expressed by many people I 
spoke with, certain that »there will be blood« (hayibqa fi dam) 
or even »there’s got to be blood« (lazim yibqa fi dam). I heard 
ot so often  that I thought about using it as the title for that 
blog entry. But optimistic as I was about the capability of the 
Tamarod campaign to provide a peaceful, civil alternative, I 
hesitated, and instead titled it »Seize the day«.
A few weeks later, the day was seized. And there was blood.
Anger escalated at an extreme pace, mutual accusations 
and provocations were unleashed, fuelled by a media cam-
paign (the mass media had been brought under nearly to-
tal government control immediately after 3 July) that made 
no distinction between truth and lies, only between friend 
and foe. A large number of Egyptians (with no reliable polls 
to tell how large) ultimately came to agree that defeating 
and killing the Muslim Brothers was necessary, right, and 
good. Throughout July, a series of violent 
clashes and massacres unfolded. Most of 
the people killed were supporters of the 
deposed president, and the most common 
cause of death was sniper fire. The escala-
tion reached its peak on 14 August 2013 in 
the storming of the Rabi‘a al-Adawiya and 
al-Nahda Square sit-ins in Cairo, which 
were followed by clashes and attacks on 
police stations and Christian properties 
in several cities. Violence has continued 
ever since, with people killed in demon-
strations, disappearing and tortured in 
prisons, Jihadist bombings aiming at po-
lice and military targets, and ordinary cit-
izens getting into fights with each other.
Both sides accused the others of being 
guilty of violence, and legitimised their 
struggle by the violence exerted by the 
other side. However, there was a great 
asymmetry in the killings. Those sup-
porting the storming of the Rabi‘a al-Ada-
wiya sit-in have regularly cited the fact 
that policemen and conscripts were also 
killed, and that some of the protesters 
were armed. According to the Ministry of 
Health, the nationwide death toll on 14 
August 2013 was 638, including 43 con-
scripts1 and police or army officers. In 
contrast, according to the documentation 
of Wiki Thawra (Wiki Thawra 2013), the 
nationwide death toll on 14 August was 
1,385 (among them 52 conscripts and po-
lice or army officers), and 399 more (48 
1 In Egypt, conscripts serve not only in the 
army but also in the ranks of the Central Security 
Forces of the Ministry of Interior.
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conscripts and officers) were killed during the 
next five days. The same source cited that the stor-
ming of the Rabi‘a al-Adawiya sit-in cost 904 lives 
alone, 7 among them policemen or conscripts (see 
Human Rights Watch 2013). Whatever the exact 
figures may be, the asymmetry is evident. What 
happened was not a battle but a massacre.
Granted that nearby countries have recently suf-
fered even greater bloodshed, notably Iraq, Sudan, 
and Syria, this still does not make Egypt a blessed 
safe haven surrounded by chaos, as the Egyptian 
state media asserts. The number of people killed 
in Egypt between summer 2013 and spring 2014 
may not be nearly as terrible as in Syria, but it is 
terrible enough to be at par with the most recent 
Israeli campaign against Gaza in 2014 (although 
Egypt has been spared the material destruction 
Gaza has suffered). The Egypt of the el-Sisi era 
has bloodshed as a founding principle, and this has 
far-reaching political and moral consequences.
One year later, the new regime lead by Abdel-
fattah el-Sisi has established its firm grip on pow-
er, but a lower level of confrontation continues, and 
so does the asymmetry in the killing. Many voices 
continue to call for the  killing of Muslim Broth-
ers and their allies because »this is the only way 
to deal with these people« (el-nas dul mayinfa‘sh 
ma‘ahum gheir keda). One of the most absurd con-
sequences of this call for killing in order to stop 
the violence is the death sentences that a judge 
passed in two trials in March and April 2014 on 
1,212 people for the murder of three policemen in 
al-Minya. In April and June, the same judge con-
firmed 220 of these sentences (which are being 
appealed), and it is unclear at the time of writing 
this whether the Egyptian judiciary system is com-
mitted to killing the sentenced men (see Human 
Rights Watch 2014). Many did not find these ver-
dicts absurd, arguing instead that the sentenced 
were terrorists who had attacked police and inno-
cent people. From their point of view, Egypt was 
facing an attack from violent and evil people, and 
the only way to deal with such people was to either 
imprison or kill them.
I do not intend to say that this was a sentiment 
shared by all Egyptians, perhaps not even the ma-
jority of them. Many were sceptical of the polarisa-
tion from the start, or have grown sceptical of it, 
and a large portion of the population remains sym-
pathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood’s cause. Most 
Egyptians continue to live in peace with one an-
other despite irreconcilable political differences. 
Nevertheless, it is the mood that helped the cur-
rent regime seize power, and resulted in a wave of 
killings that will haunt Egypt for a very long time.
The escalation in the summer of 2013 came as 
an unexpected turn of events to many of those 
who had come to appreciate and admire Egypt’s 
»peaceful revolution« along with the flourishing 
social and cultural life that the 25 January revo-
lution had unleashed. It was a common assump-
tion that the Muslim Brotherhood or some of their 
allies might opt towards violence if Morsi was 
toppled. Such violence on behalf of the defeated 
was to be expected, and some eventually did take 
place. But the violence of the victorious – which, 
by the asymmetrical nature of victory, is bound to 
be more brutal and devastating – has been much 
more extreme. The most shocking part of it was 
not its extent but the enthusiasm with which it was 
promoted by so many who just months earlier had 
expressed a considerably different stance.
And yet, this turn of events was in reality nei-
ther sudden nor surprising. Many Egyptians had 
been preparing themselves for extreme bloodshed 
since the beginning of the revolution, and if many 
Egyptian and foreign commentators failed to no-
tice it, it was not because it wasn’t there, but be-
cause we didn’t want to see it. It didn’t fit well with 
the beautiful picture of revolutionary resistance.
However, we cannot separate beautiful resis-
tance from horrible bloodshed, just as we cannot 
isolate the flourishing of cultural life from the 
spread of violent street crime in and after 2011. 
They belong to one and the same process.
What this essay is about
I have been to Egypt often before and during the 
revolution, and I have accompanied circles of 
friends who describe themselves as »revolutionar-
ies« (a position that from 2011 to 2013 was marked 
by a double rejection of the establishment of the 
old regime and of the Muslim Brotherhood) both 
in Alexandria and a village in the Nile Delta, and 
I have tried to understand the often troubling and 
contradictory nature of the revolutionary experi-
ence in ordinary life. I was not in Egypt in the sum-
mer of 2013 and did not witness the polarisation 
and escalation that happened in July and August. 
But I did see it growing in the months and years 
before. This is the background from which I ask 
two key questions: How did bloodshed emerge as a 
viable solution to the tensions and troubles of the 
revolutionary period? And how did different people 
who were on one particular side of the events from 
2011 to 2013, react to the bewildering violence of 
the victorious in the summer and autumn of 2013?
With these questions, I try to contribute to a 
conversation opened by engaged academics writ-
ing about Egypt (e.g. LeVine 2014; Ali 2014), trying 
to understand the wide-scale support for killing 
that emerged in Egypt in the summer of 2013. My 
key argument is that the violence unleashed after 
30 June 2013 was thoroughly moral in character, a 
consequence of an intensifying process of polarisa-
tion where the need to defend right against wrong 
was caught up in an ongoing sense of tension, con-
fusion, anxiety and what I for the lack of a better 
term call »emboldenment«. (There is no doubt that 
the politicians and officers in power manipulated 
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the media and moral anger in a cynical and calcu-
lating fashion to promote their struggle for power. 
But on the level of general opinion among Egyp-
tians, the moral quality of the polarisation was 
real and powerful. One should seriously consider 
the fact that politicians at times believe their own 
lies.) In this mood of »broken fear« (which is not 
the same thing as the overcoming of fear), the ex-
pectation that »there will be blood« was a prom-
ise of reaching clarity, purity and truth through 
a decisive battle. Tragically enough, it works. The 
incitement of bloodshed and the spiral of violence 
can be described as a form of ethical cultivation 
where a sense of purity is established through 
dramatic and radical confrontation. Paradoxically, 
during the bloody summer of 2013, moments of ir-
bak, that is, confusion, bewilderment, and loss of 
solid ground, were sometimes more likely to open 
up ways out of the circle of hatred and confronta-
tion while firm and clear principles might rather 
enforce that circle.
Bewilderment and confusion was the general 
mood in the summer and autumn of 2013 among 
some (probably a minority) of the leftist revolution-
aries I know. They had participated in the 30 June 
movement, but expressed a sense of shock, confu-
sion, and frustration about what resulted from the 
popular coalition in which they had participated. 
It is a sentiment that I too share with them. As 
an academic committed to support the revolution-
ary process in Egypt, I also supported the uprising 
against Morsi in the summer of 2013. The reali-
sation of having participated, if only by the very 
weak means of academic essays, in a counter-revo-
lution that has restored the Mubarak regime with 
reforms and adjustments, and at an enormous cost 
of human lives, causes moral trouble. It puts ques-
tion marks on one’s role as an academic whose job 
is to be critical and to ask difficult questions. What 
happened cannot be undone. But we can try to un-
derstand how it could happen.
The story I tell is a highly partial one. I do not 
make any claims to speak about Egypt or Egyp-
tians in general. A different story could be told if 
we looked at Muslim Brotherhood supporters, or at 
sympathisers of other Islamic movements, or at old 
regime loyalists, or at the many people who did not 
take such firm stances. But this is the story of peo-
ple who consider themselves as »revolutionaries« 
through a double opposition, towards the Mubarak 
regime on the one hand, and Islamist groups on 
the other.
One of the events of the revolution
Much critical energy has been spent on asking 
whether the events that began on 30  June 2013 
were a coup or a revolution. This is a misleading 
question.
There are two standard answers to this ques-
tion. One is that it was a coup because Morsi was 
the legitimate president and he was overthrown by 
an alliance from within the acting government and 
institutions of the state – most importantly the Mi-
nistries of Defence and Interior – and the Minister 
of Defence who directed the operation eventually 
became the new president. The other is that it was 
a revolution because it was based on a genuine 
mass movement of a variety of Egyptians overth-
rowing a failing president who refused to listen to 
the will of the people. It is true that the president 
was deposed by the Minister of Defence (who even-
tually became the new president), which by defi-
nition is a coup d’état. It is also true that this was 
supported by mass demonstrations that called for 
a revolution. But in reality, both claims are moral, 
not analytical statements. A coup is bad, a revoluti-
on is good. Saying that what happened was a coup 
is saying that what happened was bad and wrong. 
On the other hand, saying that what happened was 
a revolution is saying that it was good and right, 
or at least it was good and right in the beginning. 
But this is a misleading choice. First, it relies on 
a problematic depiction of popular legitimacy, be 
it by elections or demonstrations: if »the people« 
can be shown to support it, it is good. But beloved 
dictators are far more terrible than the hated ones 
because they can get away with crimes that are 
much worse. Second, and most importantly, the 
»revolution or coup?« choice is misleading because 
it is based on the assumption that a revolution is 
good. But why do we assume that? Revolutions 
are processes in which people are killed, things 
are broken, and in the end, the most powerful and 
ruthless parties gain power. In 1951, Albert Camus 
looked back at the great revolutionary transforma-
tions in Europe and noted:
All modern revolutions have ended in a rein-
forcement of the power of the State. 1789 brings 
Napoleon; 1848, Napoleon III; 1917, Stalin; the 
Italian disturbances of the twenties, Mussolini; 
the Weimar Republic, Hitler. These revolutions, 
particularly after the First World War had liqui-
dated the vestiges of divine right, still proposed, 
with increasing audacity, to build the city of hu-
manity and of authentic freedom. (Camus 1991)
Instead of the coup-revolution choice, I propose 
something more unpleasant. The polarisation and 
violence that followed 30 June 2013 has damaged 
Egypt and Egyptians deeply and lastingly. It has 
not only resulted in the killing of several thousands 
of people, it has also fractured and split the society 
in a way that will take generations to repair (and 
there may be much more bloodshed and damage 
ahead before the repair work can even begin). It 
has helped in the establishment of a populist dic-
tatorial regime that will rule Egypt with an iron 
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hand for many years to come (although I must add 
that many consider this an accomplishment rather 
than a detriment). Last but not least, it has lar-
gely destroyed the revolutionary movement which 
either allowed itself to be co-opted by the coun-
ter-revolution, or was marginalised by the milita-
ry vs. Muslim Brotherhood confrontation, or was 
suppressed and imprisoned. However, this was 
not a tragic derailment from the revolution’s right 
track. Instead, we need to understand the 30 June 
counter-revolution as being a consequence of the 
revolutionary process, »one of the events of the re-
volution«, as one of the revolutionaries from the 
village called it. It is a continuation of the revolu-
tionary process, a process of increasingly nervous 
tension and polarisation, and of the use of symbo-
lic politics of confrontation where martyrdom and 
violence play a crucial role.
Believing in the glorious nation
By the spring and summer of 2013, leftist revolu-
tionaries from the village had come to consider 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a greater enemy than 
the old regime. For them, it was a matter of civil 
or secular versus religious politics, among other 
reasons. But the conflict line that divided Islam-
ists from supporters of a civil and/or secular state 
would never have been sufficient to create the 
30  June coalition. The dramatic infrastructural 
problems (fuel shortage, power outages) that be-
came rampant during Morsi’s rule would alone not 
have been sufficient to create such a coalition eit-
her. The most powerful and successful allegation 
against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was 
not that they were fundamentalists, but that they 
were traitors to the nation. The opposition towards 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 was successful 
because it was articulated in nationalist terms.
The reality of Egypt after 30 June 2013 took a lot 
of Western academics as well as others by surprise 
because they did not anticipate the power of na-
tionalism. In a time when the study of globalisation 
and transnational movements is in vogue, nation-
alism has not been a sexy research topic. In recent 
anthropology of the Middle East and Islam in par-
ticular, the nation has been most likely to appear 
in the framework of a critical study of the »secular 
nation-state«, implying the opposition of religion 
and secularity, where the nation-state is the side 
of the liberal, secular framework of power, and 
thus distinct from, even opposed to society. The 
idea that the state is an external upside of power 
that is opposed to, even adversary to society and 
its moral and ethical values, is a very liberal and 
American idea. But people in the Middle East often 
have a much more ambiguous relationship with 
the state. They may be oppressed by and at odds 
with some institutions of the state, such as bureau-
cratic institutions, the police, and so on. But at the 
same time, they may express a very firm love to-
wards the nation, towards the army, towards mili-
tary struggle for national liberation. Additionally, 
through a highly expansive public service, a very 
large number of Egyptians are also government 
functionaries in one way or another, so the image 
of an invisible and invincible »deep state« needs 
to be complemented by the vision of a less mystical 
but very substantial »wide state«. (Brown 2013)
Egypt is a God-fearing country where fearing 
and trusting God is a key part of people’s moral and 
spiritual world. But Egypt is also a militantly na-
tionalist post-colonial country with a firmly root-
ed tradition of a national struggle where people 
believe in the nation, the Armed Forces, and the 
glorious October War. Patriotic values were enor-
mously reinforced and magnified in the revolution-
ary uprisings across the Arab world in 2011. The 
national flag was always a central and highly am-
biguous symbol that could be used to claim patriot-
ic unity for the sake of entirely opposed aspirations 
and ideals (Winegar 2014). Before 2011, there was 
a widespread sense of frustration that was at times 
expressed in rather anti-patriotic terms. Such anti-
patriotic sentiment largely disappeared in 2011, 
and instead, tremendous emotions festered in the 
body of the nation and »the people«. The revolution 
was very much a process of learning to love a na-
tion that until then had shown little devotion to her 
sons and daughters. In 2011, that emotion was still 
directed at an abstract body of the nation and »the 
people« in the remarkable absence of a revolution-
ary leader. During the summer of 2013, the love for 
the nation became heavily personalised in the fig-
ure of a venerated leader:  Abdelfattah el-Sisi, glori-
fied as the saviour of the nation in songs and posters 
that covered homes, public spaces, and businesses 
across the country. Morsi supporters have tried to 
depict him in a similarly heroic fashion, which was 
not easy since he was notoriously uncharismatic 
while in office. Meanwhile, he has proven himself 
to be a much more inspired and charismatic politi-
cal prisoner, using the show trial against him as a 
vehicle to stage himself as a fearless and uncom-
promising legitimate president.
Anthropologist Saba Mahmood has argued in 
regard to the Danish caricature crisis of 2006 that 
the Western public failed to understand the »la-
bour of love« invested in the Prophet Muhammad, 
making symbolic attacks against his person a mat-
ter of grave moral injury and anger (Mahmood 
2009). Looking at the highly sensitive manner in 
which many Egyptians have reacted to any kind of 
critique of the Egyptian Army and nation in 2013 
(be it by foreigners or by Egyptian critics of the 
military leadership), it seems that  military strugg-
les like the October War, the Army, and the  unity 
of the nation have a similar kind of labour of love 
invested in them – a labour of loving something 
that is often not easy to love. In a similar manner, 
there is also an ongoing cultivation of a strong sen-
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se of moral anger directed toward those who act or 
speak in a disrespectful manner about the things 
into which people invest so much love. Love is not 
just sweet and kind. It is also the ground of culti-
vating an attitude of being easily offended, and of 
feeling the  urgent need to retaliate.
Martyrdom and killing
Although the 25  January uprising was initially 
celebrated as a non-violent, peaceful revolution, 
more than a thousand people were killed by politi-
cal violence during the first 18 days that resulted 
in the fall of president Hosni Mubarak. The vast 
majority of the casualties were protesters killed by 
security forces. These events gave rise to a verita-
ble cult of the martyrs of the revolution.
In fact, martyrdom preceded the uprising. A 
key turning point was the murder of Khaled Said 
by police officers in Alexandria in the summer of 
2010, which resulted in a first wave of protests, 
and turned Khaled Said’s portrait into one of the 
most iconic images of the revolutionary period. 
The founding martyr of the revolution, Khaled Said 
has since been followed by thousands of others, 
although only a handful have made it to the promi-
nent gallery of the revolution’s martyrs. As violent 
events succeeded one another, new martyrs emer-
ged, each of them associated with their own speci-
fic struggles, claims and calls for bringing justice. 
Often, the blood of the martyrs became the key 
ground of mobilisation  more important than any 
specific political demands was  to »bring justice 
for them or die like them« (ya ngib haqquhum ya 
nmut zayyuhum).
The link between martyrdom and non-violence is 
paradoxical. The Egyptian revolution was branded 
as non-violent although many people were killed, 
and the killing continued and continues. It was 
non-violent only in the sense that while the police 
and regime loyalists killed many protesters, the 
protesters rarely killed policemen and loyalists.
Faisal Devji has pointed out that Gandhi, al-
though known for his powerful use of non-violent 
tactics, was not in principle opposed to the pos-
sibility of violence and war. According to Devji, 
Gandhi actually supported the idea of war as a pu-
rifying moment in certain situations (Devji 2012). 
Non-violence, in Devji’s reading of Gandhi, is not 
about no one getting hurt. Instead, non-violence is 
about occupying a moral high ground through an 
asymmetry of violence. The central moral princi-
ple of non-violence is that it is the other side that 
does the killing. This is where martyrdom becomes 
such a powerful weapon. The most tragic events 
have often been the most successful events of 
revolutionary movements because they have made 
people angry. As the confrontation continues, kill-
ing, martyrdom, and a righteous anger against the 
perpetrators become a central ground for the con-
tinuation of the struggle.
Polarisation
The revolution began in a polarised situation 
where opponents of the Mubarak regime were pit-
ted against the regime and its supporters in an an-
tagonistic manner. However, when the military de-
posed Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011, there 
suddenly emerged a mediated narrative of Egyp-
tians being united in victory, which they of course 
were not, because there were winners and losers. 
Antagonism was briefly buried under a vision of 
unity – a vision that quickly became a rather coun-
ter-revolutionary one, propagating a quick return 
to normality for the sake of a new, happier Egypt 
(Winegar 2011). There never actually was much 
unity, not even among the Tahrir protesters. Unity 
was claimed by silencing certain key differences. 
During the first sit-in in Tahrir Square for exam-
ple, nationalists and secular movements were able 
to coexist with the Islamist movements because 
there was a clear agreement about not making cer-
tain claims or not carrying certain symbols.
After 11  February, the revolutionary coalition 
soon broke apart, as some groups were more suc-
cessful than others in wrestling for a share of the 
power, while others were too weak to do so and in-
stead opted for principal resistance. Starting from 
early March 2011, a split emerged between the ma-
jor Islamist movements, who were well-organized 
and initially very successful in the struggle for 
power, and various leftist, liberal and less promi-
nent Islamist groups. The latter were too weak and 
disorganised to seize power, but strong enough 
to spearhead a series of new protests and crises. 
In the course of 2011, they came to be called the 
»revolutionaries«. In the following two years, this 
Image circulated in social networks and as a 
printed poster, depicting el-Sisi as »Lion Heart«
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split – corresponding partly with a long-existing 
division between Islamist and other political 
groups that the Sadat and Mubarak regimes had 
often successfully exploited in favour of one or the 
other side – developed into antagonism between 
the revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
with the revolutionaries viewing the Brotherhood 
as traitors to the cause,  and the Brotherhood try-
ing to either co-opt or marginalise the revolutio-
naries. However this picture is complicated by 
Islamist groups such as the Hazemoon, followers 
of Hazem Abu Ismail who participated in protests 
against the military rule in 2011 and 2012 and only 
joined forces with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
summer of 2012.
A turning point in this polarisation was the rise 
in power of the Muslim Brotherhood through the 
presidential elections of 2012 and their attempt to 
rule Egypt by themselves without sharing power 
with their former revolutionary allies (who were 
also not being cooperative). This resulted in old 
regime loyalists as well as leftist and liberal re-
volutionaries finding themselves on the same side 
in a new set-up of government and opposition, 
while revolutionary Islamist groups like the Haze-
moon turned into allies of the new Brotherhood-
led government.2 The rhetoric of the Mubarak and 
Nasser regimes against the Muslim Brotherhood 
was appropriated by supporters of the revolutiona-
ry current, while people who had until then been 
very sceptical of revolution and protests approp-
riated revolutionary slogans and tactics. The an-
ger of those who saw their privileges threatened 
by the emerging rule of the Brotherhood came to-
gether with the anger of those who saw the revo-
lution stolen and betrayed by the Muslim Brother-
hood. It was at this point that a narrative emerged 
according to which the Muslim Brotherhood was 
a foreign, treacherous, sectarian movement that 
did not – and could not – represent the Egyptian 
people. A shared oppositional narrative was esta-
blished where the Muslim Brothers appeared as 
fundamentalist fascists and enemies of the nation 
who needed to be stopped before they took over 
the entire country. This narrative made it possib-
le to channel oppositional anger (until then chan-
nelled against »the system«) against one specific 
group in the political scene. On the other side of 
the conflict line, a different narrative of polari-
sation was produced by supporters and allies of 
the Brotherhood, claiming that those who opposed 
2 The picture got even more complicated in early 2013 when 
the Salafi Nour Party, formerly the Muslim Brotherhood‘s 
most important ally, changed sides and joined the oppositi-
on. In 2013 and 2014, the Nour Party (which is dominated by 
clerics who have a remarkable history of loyalism towards 
the Mubarak regime) stood firmly on the side of el-Sisi, a 
strong reminder of the fact that the conflict between reli-
gious and secular politics is just one of the many important 
conflict lines.
Morsi were either Christians, godless liberals, or 
corrupt old regime elites, and thus, once again, not 
the true Muslim Egyptian people.
During three years long stormy season of revolu-
tion (I think the word »spring« would be a very mis-
leading seasonal metaphor), the landscape of politi-
cal struggle was mapped by insults and stereotypes 
more than positive identifications. In the spring of 
2011, there were agendat (»people with [foreign or 
particular] agendas«), baltagiya (»thugs«, originally 
referring to gangsters on the payroll of the police 
and government, but in spring 2011 the word beca-
me used to indicate civilians fighting on the oppo-
sing side in street battles, whichever that side may 
be), and after the fall of Mubarak, there were filul 
(»remnants« of the old regime). When the logic of 
political polarisation shifted, so did the insults. In 
the autumn of 2012, khirfan (»sheep«) became the 
standard insult against Muslim Brothers, implying 
that they were sheepishly taking orders rather than 
acting on their own accord. On their side, Islamists 
had turned the originally positive identifications 
‘almani (»secularist«) and laybirali (»liberal«) into 
accusations insinuating that liberals, secularists, 
and socialists were in fact kuffar (»infidels«), an 
accusation that was not made by Muslim Brother-
hood leaders in public discourse but more often 
expressed in the informal circles of local politics. 
In the summer of 2013, the new situation was once 
again accompanied by new insults: irhabiyin (»ter-
rorists«) and ‘abid el-biyada (»slaves of the military 
boot«) (Andeel 2014). These and other insults not 
only structured the political field, they also denied 
those at whom they were addressed the capacity of 
being people with reasonable choices of their own 
accord. Instead, they depicted supporters of the 
opposing side as delusional, stupid, and wicked. 
Whatever they would say could be safely assumed 
to be a lie.3
This escalation of mutual distrust was accompa-
nied by a series of violent events where supporters 
of different sides regularly accused the other side 
of bloodshed. It is almost impossible to get relia-
ble and independent information about what actu-
ally happened in deadly events like the Ittihadiya 
Palace on 5-6 December 2012 (where both Morsi 
opponents and supporters were killed in unclear 
circumstances after supporters of Morsi stormed 
an anti-Morsi protest camp),  at Port Said Prison 
on 26 January 2013 (where dozens were killed by 
police bullets following an attempt by protesters 
to storm the prison), or in Sidi Gaber in Alexan-
 
3  In the summer of 2013, this logic of insults gained a new  
dimension as words like »coup« or »human rights« were  
ironically misspelled as if they were foreign loanwords (بلايكنإ  
instead of بلاقنا; or ناسنلإا كوكح instead of ناسنلإا قوقح), insinuating  
that concepts such as human rights were imported, empty  
words that had no bearing on the Egyptian reality and needed  
not to be taken seriously. 
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dria in late June and early July 2013 (where Mor-
si opponents and supporters clashed over several 
days). A spiral of mutual accusations emerged, an 
exchange of opinions beyond angry shouting beca-
me almost impossible, and each side perceived the 
other as violent.
The killing of protesters in January and Febru-
ary 2011 still caused a sense of shock and anger 
that was strong enough to oust Mubarak, even if it 
wasn’t enough to actually topple the regime. Since 
then, many Egyptians had increasingly learned to 
cope with violent events and developed narratives 
and tropes of justification such as »Why were they 
there anyway?« or »They must have done something 
bad« or »They must have attacked first«, repeatedly 
cited to legitimise police brutality against protest-
ers since the autumn of 2011. Although it was un-
likely that one would accidentally find oneself in the 
middle of street clashes – they were highly local-
ised, and life continued as usual only a few blocks 
away – political violence became normal.
At the same time, supporters of the revolutio-
nary current were becoming increasingly disillusi-
oned with peaceful action. Their repeated failure 
to make a difference through elections, and their 
relative success in stirring up the situation on 
some occasions through street action, compelled 
more and more of the people I know to argue in 
the winter and spring of 2013 that elections and 
peaceful means were inadequate to remove the 
Muslim Brotherhood from power and to estab-
lish what they hoped to be a truly revolutionary 
government.
One paradoxical component of this vision was 
the trope of »Muslim Brotherhood militias« that 
was regularly cited between 2012 and 2013 by op-
ponents of the Brotherhood who claimed that the 
organisation was training paramilitary troops that 
were stepping in place of security apparatus. On 
some occasions, members of the Muslim Brother-
hood were in fact acting as an informal police force 
against their opponents (most prominently during 
the Ittihadiya clashes in November 2012 – with all 
the brutality that goes along with police work in 
Egypt, see Human Rights Watch 2012). But the vi-
sion of the »Muslim Brotherhood militias« proved 
to be an exaggeration insofar that during 2012 and 
2013 street battles, the Brotherhood’s supporters 
and their allies usually were on the losing end. If 
the Brotherhood had militias, they were not good 
for much. This created a paradoxical mixture of 
fear and opportunity: the perceived need for firm 
defence against »militias« was combined with the 
practical realisation that the Muslim Brotherhood 
was actually quite weak and could be defeated in a 
street battle (Salem 2013).
This paradox was further amplified with the 
rise of the Tamarod campaign that began to col-
lect signatures in the spring of 2013 for a popular 
impeachment of Morsi, with significant success. 
The Tamarod movement represented itself as a le-
gal and non-violent movement to make the people’s 
voice heard. But when I was in Egypt in May and 
June 2013, I constantly heard people speaking 
about  an impending bloodbath. The expectation 
was that the Brotherhood would not go voluntarily. 
They would fight back fiercely. They would need to 
be forced.
Broken fear
The expectation that the others would fight fierce-
ly was grounded, in part, in their own readiness 
to fight. Therefore, ideological polarisation is not 
the whole story. More was needed to make blood-
shed seem a reasonable, even desirable path for a 
resolution.
The now proverbial »breaking of fear« has been 
frequently mentioned as one of the few true ac-
complishments of the uprisings of 2011 in the 
Arab world. Authoritarian regimes like those of 
Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Asad relied strongly on 
fear as the driving force that compelled citizens 
to avoid head-on confrontation and to be complicit 
with the system, even if they hated it. This senti-
ment is articulated well in the idiomatic expres-
sion yimshi ganb el-hita (»to walk by the side of the 
wall«), that is, to mind one’s own business and to 
avoid the kind of confrontation and exposure that 
would result from pushing one’s way through the 
middle of the street.
The revolutionary uprising marked a moment 
when a lot of people stopped walking by the side 
of the wall and instead boldly asserted their will, 
point of view, and way of doing things. There was 
a shake-up of many social taboos and inhibitions. 
Opinions that had been kept secret were openly 
expressed. Conflicts that had been suppressed 
were openly carried out. After the subdued mood 
of the Mubarak era, the mood of life became more 
radical and outspoken, and full of nervous tension. 
The examples commonly cited sound rather sym-
pathetic: a flourishing artistic and cultural life, 
couples more likely to show their affection publicly, 
a multitude of different visions of life and points of 
view, and an ongoing series of protests and strikes 
vying to right wrongs instead of enduring them. But 
the same sense of emboldenment has also meant 
an increase in street crime, more violent sexual 
harassment, people settling their private conflicts 
with guns in the streets, an aggressive and impolite 
tone  in interactions between people, and the idea 
that the best way to deal with one’s political oppo-
nents is to eradicate them from the face of Earth.
Novelist Mukhtar Shehata, with whom I work on 
a research project about writers and literary care-
ers in Alexandria, argues that the breaking of fear 
has been mistaken for a disappearance of fear. In-
stead, he says in an essay written in the spring of 
2013 that we need to ask what has come in place of 
the fear that marked the Mubarak era:
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The truth is that neither has fear been broken, 
nor have any other emotions been removed. 
Rather, these are new emotions born out of the 
preceding chaos of emotions. [...] Thus the emo-
tion of natural, immediate fear is replaced by an 
entirely new emotion which we do not know but 
we call it ›the broken fear‹. (Shehata 2013)
In other words, broken fear is a positively existing 
sentiment: it is fear, but broken, reconfigured in 
a seemingly chaotic way. It can be described as 
an affective complex in its own right that involves 
anxiety, excitement, terror, courage, unrest, hope, 
and an attitude of assertively standing up for one’s 
own point of view. Broken fear as the emotional 
tone of the revolutionary stormy season does not 
allow us to neatly distinguish between the positive 
and negative effects of the revolution. They belong 
to the same process, the same sentiment.
As time passed, the destructive side of that pro-
cess became more and more evident in the shape of 
nervous tension, aggression, confusion, and anxiety. 
In the traumatising »chaos of emotions«, the path of 
assertive, aggressive action appeared as a way out.
In the winter of 2012-13, a friend of mine argued 
that the only way out of the current deadlock was 
to go from house to house and to kill all the Mus-
lim Brothers. Powerful and destructive as such 
»fighting words« (Bangstad 2011) can be, they are 
not the same as fighting. This mentioned friend is 
known as a man whose words are bigger than his 
actions. Nobody expected him to follow his own 
advice. Eventually, when the killing actually began 
(although it happened in squares and not in hous-
es), he was against it. Such fantasies of violence 
are part of the process towards actual bloodshed, 
and yet they might have meant little if it weren’t 
for the possibility to turn them into a reality. Bro-
ken fear was the condition of that possibility, for 
it also affected many taboos and inhibitions that 
were about maintaining social peace.
Peace is not obvious. It needs to be maintained. 
Often, it is maintained at a heavy cost. In situa-
tions where people live in close proximity and mu-
tual dependency while deeply disliking each other, 
peace can be much more important than justice. 
Rural customary law (‘urf) councils, for example, 
are generally primarily aimed at reaching a com-
promise and restoring peace rather than estab-
lishing truth or delivering justice. But in the mood 
of assertive, anxious emboldenment, the mecha-
nisms of keeping peace became increasingly hard 
to uphold, and a terrible, decisive battle became 
an increasingly attractive and likely option.
Decisive battle
The famous 18 days of January and February 2011 
actually felt like a decisive battle. But soon it be-
came clear that the struggle had only begun, and 
that little had been decided. In early autumn 2011, 
in a time when the still great expectations of radi-
cal change faced the resilience of the old system 
that continued to rule Egypt in the shape of the Su-
preme Council of the Armed Forces, I heard people 
talking for the first time about a decisive, bloody 
battle as a viable solution.
Today, opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood re-
fer to Youtube videos where Brotherhood leaders 
argue that the death of some is acceptable to reach 
the good of all, in order to prove that the Brother-
hood has always seen violence as a path to power. 
But the Brotherhood leaders were just saying what 
a lot of other people were saying, too. In October 
2011, for example, one of the revolutionary leftists 
from the village argued with me that the peaceful 
revolution had come to a dead end, and that the 
only way to truly overcome the Mubarak regime 
and to make a fresh start would be a Libyan-style 
armed revolution – in other words, a civil war. If it 
would cost the lives of 10% of Egyptians, it would 
still be a small price to pay for a better future for 
the country, he said.
In the spring and early summer of 2013, a terri-
ble decisive battle was expected and desired, not 
only by the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood 
but also by many of its supporters and allies who 
at that moment still believed that the Army was on 
their side. There was an escalation of more or less 
open mutual threats which, in turn, could be uti-
lised as accusations for promoting violence.
The idea of a decisive battle is based on the pro-
mise that it will establish how things are, show 
who is the boss, and replace anxiety and ambiva-
lence by certainty and clarity. It is very appealing 
because in part, it is true. Struggle can establish 
clarity.
M., a university graduate in his early twenties, 
belongs to the circle of leftists from the village. 
He lives in Alexandria, considers himself a socia-
list, and is firmly opposed to the Muslim Brother-
hood and other Islamist movements. On 28  June 
2013, he participated in one of the street battles 
in Sidi Gaber in Alexandria that took place befo-
re and after 30 June. Sidi Gaber is one of the key 
sites for demonstrations in Alexandria, and was 
at that time claimed by the two mutually hostile 
currents, resulting in repeated clashes (Ali 2013). 
These clashes took place largely in the absence of 
police, and a small number of firearms were used. 
(As usual, both sides claimed that the other side 
was responsible for the violence and for using fire-
arms.) This is how M. experienced the clashes on 
28 June:
When the thugs of the Brotherhood attacked us 
on the 28th while we went to protest in Sidi Ga-
ber, that brought one to the point that you have 
to... You reached a level where you frightened 
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them, and they are now coming to terrorise 
you, or to shake you up a bit. And the people 
who were hit in front of our eyes... Maybe... 
There was an old man inside the Sidi Gaber 
tunnel, I took him out of there, he had been 
hit by a bullet in his shoulder. In his arm, 
the bone... it wasn’t clear, but there seemed 
to be no bone left, his arm was smashed. We 
brought him to the field hospital. There the 
doctor said, ›That’s a dumdum bullet. That’s 
the same kind of bullet that killed the mar-
tyr al-Husseini Abu Deif.‹4 It made you feel... 
You reached a point where, if you had had any 
doubt previously... if you had had any hope 
that those people [i.e. the Muslim Brothers] 
might have done so to defend a cause, now 
they were defending the position of power 
they had. They would repeat what they did 
before, they wouldn’t be afraid at all to repeat 
it with you or others. [ ] After that, you con-
tinue [i.e. join the 30  June demonstrations], 
while at the same time you object to there 
being people in the demonstration with you 
who chant ›Join us, el-Sisi!‹ (inzil ya Sisi). But 
there are also people with you in Sidi Gaber, 
not at the Northern Military Headquarters,5 
people who love to chant for the martyrs and 
who hold their pictures, who are not in the de-
monstration to support a certain person.
M. tells us (in an interview recorded in mid-Oc-
tober 2013) how the experience of violence came 
together with a political history of struggle and 
created a moment of truth and decision in spite 
of the doubts he continued to have. This is one 
of the most attractive and terrifying aspects of 
engaging in violent confrontation.
Anthropologist Oskar Verkaaik, writing 
about ethnic violence in the city of Hyderabad 
in the province of Sindh in Pakistan, argues 
that daily life and also low-level conflicts are 
characterised by ambiguity and negotiability 
where there is space for playfulness and where 
radical ideas don’t need to result in radical acts. 
But when the people involved sense that there 
is an urgent existential threat for collective sur-
vival, and when people are being killed, there 
emerges a »condensation of negotiable beliefs 
into a single existential truth, a conviction that 
leaves no room for other memories or beliefs.« 
4 Al-Husseini Abu Deif was a photojournalist who was 
killed in the clashes at the Ittihadiya Palace in Novem-
ber 2012. His killers were never identified, but in the 
anti-Morsi opposition it was considered certain that they 
were from the Muslim Brotherhood.
5 The Northern Military Headquarters and Sidi Gaber 
Station are less than one kilometre apart. The headquar-
ters were a focal point of anti-military protests in 2011 
and 2012, and of pro-military sentiment on 30 June 2013.
(Verkaaik 2004: 140) Verkaaik argues that notions 
of ethnic purity alone do not lead to violence. Most 
of the time, people with mutually antagonistic vi-
sions of purity live in peace. But when violent con-
frontation occurs, such notions become real in 
action, and people involved sense that the truth 
is revealed, that things are clear and certain. Fol-
lowing Verkaaik’s argument, I suggest that the 
ideological polarisation and power struggle of dif-
ferent movements and institutions did not as such 
result in the escalation of violence unleashed in 
the summer of 2013. The expectation of bloodshed 
grew and became concrete because it was accom-
panied by an assertive mood of broken fear and by 
repeated events of bloodshed, providing more and 
more certainty and clarity about the upcoming de-
cisive battle.
Escalation
Then came 30  June 2013. Supported by massive 
demonstrations, the army deposed Morsi on 3 July 
and instated a nominally civilian government. 
Morsi and the Brotherhood leadership went to pri-
son, his supporters took to the streets, and the dy-
namic of polarisation and violence took a different 
turn.
The expectation among many in the 30  June 
movement had been that the Muslim Brotherhood 
would attack the protesters, which would have 
provided an ultimate delegitimisation of their rule. 
However, the killing that happened on 30 June was 
almost exclusively related to the storming and 
defence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s headquar-
ters and offices. Perhaps the Brotherhood leaders 
would have wanted to use force against the pro-
testers on the streets, but they no longer had the 
military and police under their control. Perhaps 
they did not want to do it anyway, knowing it would 
delegitimise them even more. Whatever the case, 
with the police and army changing sides, the bal-
ance and asymmetry of lethal force had already 
shifted.
Caricature published on an Islamist satirical Facebook site. Text 
on the hand reads: »[Electoral] legitimacy is the red line«. Text 
on the face that gets beaten up reads: »Liberalism; secularism; 
communism; socialism«. Images and social media posts like this 
often were copied into anti-Brotherhood media that used them 
as proof of the inherently violent nature of their opponents.
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After 3 July, the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
allies followed a strategy of mass protests and 
martyrdom, at times intentionally provoking the 
military, and turning every massacre against pro-
testers – and there were many massacres – into a 
moral claim for the righteousness of their cause of 
»legitimacy«.6 The new de facto military govern-
ment with the 30  June alliance on their side de-
clared that they were »fighting terrorism«, even 
before terrorist attacks began. »Fighting terro-
rism« means declaring your enemy to be outside 
the realms of the law, negotiations, and fair treat-
ment. A »terrorist«, regardless of whether he or 
she actually commits any acts of terrorism, is by 
definition a person who can and must be caught or 
killed before he or she can act.
Martyrdom for legitimacy versus war against 
terrorism was the recipe for an irreconcilable 
stand-off that made the escalation very easy, and 
retreat very difficult. According to Verkaaik, the 
confrontation in Hyderabad in 1990 reached a 
point of no return partly through the use of power-
ful symbolic politics, that made it impossible for 
the other side to retreat without losing face. This 
resulted in a situation where police officers fac-
ing a women’s march had no way out and »went 
berserk« (Verkaaik 2004: 152), with deadly conse-
quences. In a similar manner, the different sides 
of the confrontation in Egypt staged a series of 
powerful symbolic actions in June and July 2013 
that left the other party with a choice between a 
humiliating capitulation and an escalation of the 
confrontation. The Rabi‘a al-Adawiya sit-in was 
the most tragic of these confrontations. The sup-
porters of Morsi, who had declared to be steadfast 
for their cause until martyrdom, could not retreat. 
The military and its allies, having declared their 
enemies to be terrorists who must be eliminated 
so that the nation can live, would not let them be. 
Long before the massacre, everybody knew that 
the stand-off was going to result in a massacre. 
Every symbolic gesture in the name of the nation, 
religion, the people, revolution, or the martyrs 
made it more difficult to retreat.
This logic was not new – it was introduced in 
the spring of 2011 when protesters would react 
to the refusal of the government to accept their 
demands by instead raising their demands. It had 
6 »Legitimacy« refers to the electoral mandate of Morsi‘s 
presidency. But in the Islamist discourse in 2013, the notion 
was transformed into an increasingly abstract and absolute 
category that referred not so much to the numbers of votes 
in elections as it invoked the total legality and legitimacy of 
the Brotherhood‘s claim for power and the illegality and il-
legitimacy of competing claims. Because it is an empty, legal 
category, it turned out to be a poor propagandistic means to 
regain popular support in the summer of 2013. It has never-
theless become deeply entrenched in the political language 
of the opponents of the 30  June movement
also always successfully prevented compromises 
and constructive solutions.
The shift in the asymmetry of violence and the 
irreconcilable stand-off were accompanied by ma-
cabre shifts in how people spoke about sometimes 
martyrdom, and at other times legitimate force. 
Many people who saw themselves as revolutionar-
ies continued to celebrate the memory of martyrs 
like Mina Danial (killed by the army on 9 October 
2011), Sheikh Emad Ezzat (killed by the army on 
16 December 2011), or Jika (Gaber Salah, killed by 
the police in November 2012) while at the same 
time supporting the army and the police in kill-
ing Morsi supporters. Among the Brotherhood sup-
porters, the same people who in January-February 
2013 had legitimised and defended the killing of 
protesters by the police in the Port Said Prison 
massacre, now found themselves the targets of 
new massacres executed by the same police force. 
As the supporters of Morsi claimed those killed 
by the police as martyrs, those who opposed them 
accused them of »trafficking with blood«, that 
is, turning the deaths of their own into a politi-
cal asset. But the way the Brotherhood employed 
martyrdom as a political asset was not so differ-
ent from the way in which the revolutionary cur-
rent had repeatedly turned the deaths of their own 
into powerful symbols of struggle, nor was it more 
strategical than the way Egyptian media publicly 
remembered the deaths of Egyptian soldiers and 
policemen killed in bomb attacks and the military 
campaign in the Sinai.
Although both sides continued to see the other 
side as the primary perpetrator of violence, the 
»war against terrorism« brought a different logic 
Graffiti depicting Mina Danial (right) and Sheikh Emad 
Ezzat, Cairo, February 2013. Photo by Samuli Schielke
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to the violence: a violence of supremacy that no 
longer fit into the moral logic of defensive strugg-
le and martyrdom. Such violence of supremacy no 
longer abided by the logic of relative equity of res-
ponse. It required an inhuman, terrorist enemy to 
whom such considerations of equity did not apply. 
Even in the absence of actual violence, the mere 
fact that the other side would act in a provocative 
manner became an existential threat that legiti-
mised a call to eradicate them. The more the pro-
military party demonised its enemies, the more 
demonic it became.
M. remembers the discussions at that time, in-
creasingly hovering around the desire to put a 
clear end point to the confrontation, regardless of 
the cost, to live and let die:
Then it reached a point where every day you 
say that these farces and theatres that were go-
ing on in the sit-ins of Rabi‘a and aal-Nahda, 
and the massacres that happened with them in 
Isaaf Square or in Ramses, or at the Presidential 
Guard... All the incidents that happened made 
one say, ›This farce must have an end.‹ But how 
to end it? People tell you, ›Just storm it, man! Fin-
ish it!‹ The thing one most heard was, ›What’s 
the problem if we finish them off?‹ With the same 
logic of Morsi, ›So what if one dies so that the oth-
ers can live?‹ No! No matter how much the people 
wanted it to end, and you see that those are your 
enemies and they don’t deserve to live, it’s not OK 
that you get to the point of exterminating them 
so that you can get rid of them altogether, or so 
that you can live and take their place.
But as M.’s strong misgivings show, this was not a 
smooth process, and not everybody bought into it. A.S., 
a man in his mid-twenties from a bourgeois family in 
Alexandria, had participated in protests ever since 
25  January 2011. He was on the streets in January 
and February 2011, during the Mohamed Mahmoud 
Portrait distributed on social networks depicting Hala Abu 
Sha‘sha‘, who was killed in El Mansoura in July 2013 during 
her participation in a pro-Morsi demonstration
TV footage from the military funeral of conscripts killed in 
action in Rafah in the Sinai, distributed as a still image on 
social networks in August 2013
uprising in November and December 2011, as well 
as on many other occasions. He was injured twice 
and experienced narrow escapes from death. Those 
were the most beautiful days of his life. He also par-
ticipated in the 30  June movement, and on 5  July 
2013, he was among a large group of demonstra-
tors facing a large group of Morsi supporters in Sidi 
Gaber in Alexandria. 12 people were killed in the 
clashes that evolved. The night after the clashes, he 
wrote on his Facebook page:
What happened today in Alexandria wasn’t a 
victory for us because we pushed the Muslim 
Brothers to the sea and caught and killed many 
of them, and neither was it a victory for the Mus-
lim Brothers because they shot us with birdshot 
and killed many of us. What... what happened 
today was a human tragedy. The people on both 
sides no longer felt what they were doing. They 
just lost their humanity, and were left with their 
wickedness and love for blood and burning and 
killing. They began to enjoy when they killed 
more, and they boast that they killed somebody 
with a knife in his head or burned his car. That 
is, when the Muslim Brothers throw one down 
from the roof and when he dies they shout, ›God 
is great‹, celebrating the blood... And when the 
revolutionaries catch one of the Muslim Broth-
ers, and he tries to escape, and they gather 
around him, 100 of them, like hungry animals 
who found a piece of meat and everybody wants 
a bit of it, happy as hell that they killed him and 
got rid of the agent and traitor. What stopped 
me in the middle of all what happened, was 
when I saw the Salafi man wounded in front of 
me, the blood flooding the street, and his eyes 
frightened. At that moment, I imagined that my 
brother, who is a Salafi, could be in the place 
of that man. At that moment, I couldn’t stay the 
master of my nerves, and I could no longer un-
derstand anything any more. For me, this has 
nothing to do with either religion, or revolution, 
or citizenship/patriotism (muwatana).
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A.S. was shocked and confused when the beauty 
of revolutionary street action transformed into 
a bloodthirsty frenzy. For him, this particular 
struggle – unlike all the ones preceding – brought 
no clarity but instead confusion, a shattering of the 
certainty he had had. And yet it would not shatter 
his enmity towards the Muslim Brothers, although 
it did alienate him from the short-lived alliance he 
and others like him had made with military enthu-
siasts.
The shock and confusion experienced by A.S. was 
born from witnessing the ugly and wicked reality 
of decisive battles. But the vast majority of Egyp-
tians only experienced those events through the 
media – heavily filtered at best, fabricated and 
twisted at most. For those following the events on 
their television screens and on social media, nei-
ther the frenzy and joy of killing nor the shattering 
and confusing experience of being part of it were 
part of their experience of the escalation. Instead, 
they were offered a much more convenient vision 
about right and wrong, a vision where their ene-
mies were acting in a wicked, bloodthirsty frenzy 
while their own side was taking measured, neces-
sary steps to defend the nation against an existen-
tial threat. When the fantasy of bloodshed became 
real, it needed to be heavily filtered to make it feel 
necessary and appropriate, to prevent moments of 
shock and confusion like the one A.S. experienced. 
The illusion of acting in a necessary and limited fa-
shion against inhumanely wicked enemies helped 
people oscillate between two seemingly incompa-
tible stances: a call to kill the enemy, and the insis-
tence that it was the enemy who was being violent. 
It is one thing to call for a massacre, and another 
thing to admit having participated in one. It is also 
much easier to lose one’s humanity in front of a 
television screen.
No tears for Rabi‘a
This is the moment when what had once been the 
revolutionary current fell apart. It did not fall apart 
because they would have disagreed about the 
30 June – they were in united in that regard.7 Nor 
was it a disagreement about their enmity towards 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The split was caused by 
their different stances concerning violence and the 
role of the military leadership. The decisive event, 
at least in the village in the Nile Delta, was el-Sisi’s 
call to Egyptians to give him the popular »manda-
te« (tafwid) to fight terrorism. The popular man-
date, which was followed by a massacre against 
7 Some supporters of the revolutionary current did not join 
the 30 June movement because they resented the prominent 
role played by Mubarak loyalists, but in the village, the left-
ist revolutionary social circles stood united in their support 
of 30 June.
Morsi’s supporters the next morning,8 provided 
the key legitimation for the storming of Rabi‘a 
and al-Nahda less than three weeks later. Those 
who joined the large-scale demonstrations of the 
popular mandate considered those who didn’t as 
cowards and traitors. In contrast, those who didn’t 
join the popular mandate (probably fewer in num-
bers) considered those who did as having sold out 
the principles of the revolution.
Those opposed to the popular mandate took re-
course to a counter-discourse against polarisation 
and killing that had already formed in June 2013, 
making use of the humanist notion of humanity/hu-
maneness (insaniya) and the Islamic notion of the 
sanctity of blood (hurmat al-dam), the prohibition 
of shedding the blood of one’s own. Among the vil-
lage leftists, this stance was made most explicit by 
a middle-aged former member of the Communist 
Party who emphasised that his stance was »not a 
political but a moral one«:
If we ask about those who got killed in Rabi‘a: 
›What were they doing there anyway?‹ (eh illi 
waddahum hinak?), then what were those killed 
on 25  January doing there anyway, and what 
where those killed in Mohamed Mahmoud doing 
there anyway, and what were they all doing the-
re anyway? 
That being said, it would be mistaken to claim that 
those who refused the popular mandate were act-
ing in a moral way, while those who adhered to it 
were not. In a moment of immediate confrontation, 
the loss of moral inhibitions and the outbreak of 
hysterical anger can be an uncontrollable and ex-
plosive situation where people just go berserk. But 
maintaining a mood of righteous anger for weeks 
or months requires a more conscious work of in-
citement. It also requires a mood of calm justifica-
tion of necessity in the face of urgency.
Morality’s location is where spontaneous and 
cultivated emotions meet, and where intuitive gut 
reactions and reflection come together. Compas-
sion, love, anger, fear, boldness, friendship and 
enmity can all be spontaneous affects as well as 
moral principles, and they can be extended or re-
stricted to a greater or smaller number of people. 
Maintaining uncompromising anger can be just as 
moral as insisting on the sanctity of blood. In fact, 
those revolutionaries who in the summer of 2013 
stood on the side of uncompromising anger were 
8 Protesters from the Rabi‘a sit-in tried to expand the area 
of the sit-in toward the Monument of the  Unknown Soldier – 
an extremely symbolic location for the Egyptian army – and 
nearly one hundred people were killed when the security 
forces used live ammunition to disperse the protesters in 
the early morning hours of 27 July 2013.
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very affirmative that their stance was the morally 
righteous one.
M.S. moved in the same circles of revolutionary 
leftists in the village. He belonged to those who 
joined the popular mandate, and for several months, 
he was not on good talking terms with those who 
rejected it. In July 2013, he wrote to me, very angry 
about what in my view was my opposition to arbi-
trary killings, but in his view was my support for 
the fascist Muslim Brotherhood. In remarkably in-
ternationalist terms, he criticised me for failing to 
support the anti-fascist struggle that should be the 
shared cause of the worldwide left. When I finally 
met him during my next visit to Egypt in October 
2013, our tempers had calmed somewhat, and he 
explained his point of view to me.
Yes, he had been calling »down with military 
rule« during the rule of the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces in 2011-12, but now, he claimed, 
the situation was different. As a leftist, secularist 
activist and an intellectual, he was facing a funda-
mentally violent fascist movement, and that move-
ment had to be defeated. As an intellectual, he ex-
plained, he was not able to beat them in a street 
fight. To do that, the muscle and the organisation 
of the army were necessary. For M.S., this was not 
only a strategic choice. It was a matter of principle. 
As a Nasserist and a nationalist, he sees the army 
and the nation as united – however, he sees the 
role of the army as the protector, not as the leader 
of the nation. For M.S., who is an active supporter 
of Nasserist politician Hamdeen Sabbahi, el-Sisi 
did the right thing in the summer of 2013, but he 
should not have become president. Even months 
later, when increasing scepticism spread in the 
former revolutionary circles who found it hard to 
deny the reality of a full-scale re-consolidation of 
the old regime, he made his stance clear on his Fa-
cebook account: »So you may call me a mutabbalati 
(»drummer«, propagandist for the regime) and an 
old regime loyalist, but still the Muslim Brothers 
are not Egyptians just like us, and not all blood is 
haram.«
Support for the violence of supremacy did not 
necessarily go hand in hand with support or respect 
for the military’s role. R., a woman from Alexandria 
active in the revolutionary movement, invested no 
hope in the military, but she also shed no tears for 
those killed in Rabi‘a. When I met her in the spring 
of 2014 and we sorted out our different points of 
view, she insisted that what was happening was 
»two armed gangs finishing each other off.« The 
Rabi‘a sit-in was armed, she told me. There were 
only perpetrators, no victims. She and many oth-
ers put much effort in discursively establishing an 
equilibrium in the violence that would allow one to 
claim the position of a righteous outsider and not to 
ask certain uncomfortable questions.
Be it in the exposed militancy of M.S., or in the 
way R. took distance from the events by placing 
equal blame on the parties involved, these stanc-
es required reflection, consideration about right 
and wrong, means and ends. They along with oth-
ers were involved in what contemporary anthro-
pology calls ethics (Laidlaw 2013; Lambek 2010; 
Mahmood 2009): the reflection about the relation-
ship of values and actions, and the cultivation of 
those values as attitudes. They had strong opin-
ions about right and wrong, and they had thought 
about them thoroughly.
The term »ethics« seems sympathetic because it 
is associated with being good, consistent, respon-
sible, and trying to do the right thing. But when 
people argue that the good, right and responsible 
thing to do is to kill their enemies,  ethics reveals 
a darker side of human wickedness that needs to 
be taken seriously.
In his book The Rebel (Camus 1991), first pub-
lished in 1951, Albert Camus addresses murder 
as the key philosophical problem of the 20th cen-
tury – a philosophical problem in the very practi-
cal sense that philosophy has provided justifica-
tions for the oppression and killing of people for 
the sake of higher aims and ends. This problem 
quite evidently remains relevant in the 21st cen-
tury, too. Low, criminal aims can rarely cause as 
much havoc as high, lofty ideals.
This is not to ignore the fact that power strugg-
les and the defence of vested interests propelled 
much of the events of the summer of 2013, nor 
that there were people in charge who cynically 
and cunningly employed moral panic in order to 
consolidate their power. But power and interests 
are not separate from moral concerns. To defend 
»our« way of life is a matter of interests and values 
alike, it is about what we value highly as the right 
and good, and it is about the specific rights and 
the material goods that we enjoy and do not want 
to give up. Truly cynical people are rare, and many 
mass murders have been committed by people who 
were idealists on their own terms.
In her reportage Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah 
Arendt argues that the most terrifying part about 
Adolf Eichmann was that he was not the fanatical 
monster as the prosecution tried to depict him. 
Eichmann saw himself as a law-abiding citizen 
who had read Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practi-
cal Reason but later replaced the Kantian idea of 
abstract duty by the Nazi idea of duty towards the 
Führer (Arendt 2006: 136-7). In the terms of con-
temporary anthropology, Eichmann was engaged 
in a reflection about the relation and form of acts 
and norms. If the engineer of one of the world’s 
greatest mass murders can be described as an eth-
ical man, then we need to rethink what we actually 
intend when we talk about morality and ethics.
One of the key tasks of anthropologists is to take 
seriously points of view and visions of life they 
do not share, even if they strongly disagree with 
them. Understanding rather than judging should 
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be our task. In the past couple of decades, West-
ern anthropologists have become reasonably adept 
at recognising the ethics involved in Islamist re-
vivalist piety, although its aims and ends can be 
radically at odds with what most anthropologists 
believe in. Anthropologists have been less adept, 
however, at giving the same benefit of the doubt to 
paranoid nationalism in Europe (or to the Christian 
right in the US, for that matter). One can speculate 
about the reasons. My hunch is that it is because 
anthropologists in their own societies are often po-
litically and ideologically in an open conflict with 
supporters of populist and paranoid nationalism. 
We are less tempted to be judgemental and deroga-
tory when we speak about people who are not our 
immediate enemies. But this is not an excuse. If we 
can give extreme piety the benefit of the doubt on 
its ethical nature, then we must be able to give the 
same benefit on extreme nationalism.
With this, I do not mean to say that we should all 
become relativists who agree that whatever peo-
ple claim to be right is right for them. Morality is 
about living with others. It is about contact, com-
munication and conflict. There are no relativistic 
cultural islands. M.S.’s recourse to the leftist in-
ternationalist discourse of anti-fascism is a case in 
point. What I mean is that we must heed the fact 
that human evil and wickedness are rooted in the 
desire to defend the good. There is no safe realm 
for ultimate righteousness.
A plea for confusion and weakness
To have a consistent moral stance, one needs to 
engage in reflection – alone or, more typically, 
with others – about what is right, what is impor-
tant, and what is to be done. One needs to cul-
tivate it in one’s acts and attitudes. But moral 
reflection also requires moral oblivion. To have 
faith in something, one must be sceptical about 
things that might trouble one’s faith. Even bet-
ter, one should not think about such things at all. 
One has to develop sensibilities and attitudes 
that make one sarcastic, condescending, or an-
gry about acts and claims that could constitute 
a competing sense of right and good. One has to 
use double standards without noticing that one 
is doing so. In short, one has to make oneself im-
mune towards the views and lifestyles that would 
trouble the sense of right and good which one has 
worked hard to make one’s own.
The cultivation of moral injury, the way people 
develop a deep anger about seeing, say, their nati-
onal symbols or their venerated religious figures 
challenged, is a good case of how moral oblivion 
works. Another case is the kind of academic lef-
tism that is very strong among anthropologists in 
the West. Anthropologists can be highly critical 
about global power inequalities while not paying 
much attention towards the way in which their 
own careers are rooted in a class society.
At no other time is moral oblivion as crucial as 
in the time of a righteous struggle. This, if any, 
is the moment of clear, firm stances, a moment of 
action, a moment of purity. It is a moment when it 
is necessary to not see things from your enemy’s 
point of view, and to not question one’s own posi-
tion, but to instead go with the flow of righteous 
anger. Remembering that the bearded man lying 
on the street could be one’s own brother would 
destabilise the consistency of the struggle and 
contaminate its oblivious purity. Purity is a very 
dirty business.
Such ethics of purity and struggle came to domi-
nate the scene in Egypt in the summer of 2013, 
preceded and made possible by two and a half 
years of polarisation and the mixture of aggres-
sive emboldenment and anxious uncertainty that, 
for the lack of a better word, was called »broken 
fear«. Among those who sided with el-Sisi’s »war 
on terrorism«, a societal and medial frenzy of ex-
treme anger and disbelief towards those who stood 
on the other side – liars, terrorists, not Egyptians 
like all of us – combined with a convenient oblivion 
about the real shape and extent of the killing and 
torture that was being committed by one’s own 
side, worked towards a sense of certainty that cen-
tred on the positive value of the nation and a sense 
of urgency that centred on the threat of terrorism. 
This made the bloodshed that followed not only 
possible, but also justified, measured, and neces-
sary from the point of view of those who sided with 
the »war on terrorism«.
If terrible crimes can be committed in the name 
of lofty values, if any stance and any action can be 
ethical with the help of some hard work of cultiva-
tion, reflection and oblivion, if anger and fury are 
such a successful way to prevent potential doubt, 
then what hope can there be? Can there be a mo-
ral stance that may not, in the right circumstan-
ces, join the campaign for the mass killing of those 
whose stance is wrong?
Consistency and reflexivity do not provide a way 
out. A refusal of political violence in the name of 
»humanity« and the »sanctity of blood« can be as 
consistent and well-thought-out as the call for a 
relentless »war against terror« for the sake of a 
strong nation, and the same applies to the com-
mitment to martyrdom and confrontation for the 
sake of »Islamic Law and electoral legitimacy« (el-
shari‘a wa-l-shar‘iya), as it also applies to a Jihadist 
bombing campaign of »martyrdom attacks«. Each 
stance relies on certain things taken for granted, 
certain questions not asked, certain instinctive 
reactions escalated while others are suppressed.
But of course, humans are seldom consistent. 
Consistency requires struggle – both in the sense 
that one must sometimes struggle to maintain an 
»illusion of consistency« (Ewing 1990), as well as 
in the sense that a meaningful struggle is the most 
powerful way to maintain that illusion. Peace, in 
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comparison, is a messy and hypocritical affair 
of compromises, concessions, and questionable 
deals. And most of the time, humans live in rela-
tive peace.
And yet struggle creates not only moments of 
clarity but also moments of confusion, moments 
when the cultivation of certainty and oblivion 
fails. One such moment was A.S.’s shock when the 
beauty of the struggle transformed into the joy of 
killing. Another such moment is described by M. in 
the following. M. does not reject political violence 
in principle, but soon after 30 June, he became sus-
picious of the military leadership’s intentions and 
participated in the discourses of humanity and 
the sanctity of blood. However, in the middle of an 
unresolved stand-off and a media outroar of one 
alarming report after another, he, too, began to 
hope that the storming of the Rabi‘a al-Adawiya 
sit-in would put an end to the escalation, and at 
first he even bought into the official narrative of 
»self-constraint« by the police:
We were happy when the storming of Rabi‘a be-
gan. In the beginning, when the storming be-
gan, We were sitting together and watching [on 
television]. We thought: ›Beautiful! They are 
evicting them without hurting them. Just shoo-
ting some tear gas at them...‹ And all the stuff 
that was said on TV at first, and all the images 
that were broadcast on ONTV or the other chan-
nels that were covering it.9 […] We were all... 
or never mind ›we‹, let me just speak for mys-
elf. I was sitting and watching, and I was happy 
that it was over, and that it was just tear gas 
without excessive violence, and I said, ›Now you 
really are doing something. You are decreasing 
the tension inside the people against the Mus-
lim Brothers. You put an end to it, and relieve 
people from the violence that was accumulating 
inside those in the Rabi‘a and al-Nahda sit-ins.‹ 
And then, when the numbers got known, and the 
aggression and violence that happened, and the 
horrible way they dealt with the people inside 
the Rabi‘a sit-in... And graver than the numbers 
of people who got killed was how the people 
who previously were angry about violent treat-
ment against anybody, now when the violence 
was against others and far from them... It ma-
kes your realise that before, you weren’t against 
violence just because you are against violence. 
People were against violence because it targe-
ted them. When it turned away from them and 
targeted those they hate, it became good. Now 
they want it, prefer it, and they demand that it is 
9 M. and his friends would not watch Al-Jazeera which they 
disliked and distrusted because of its pro-Muslim Brother-
hood bias.
used against those people, and they tell you that 
that’s the only way to deal with those people.
M.’s stance was not a consistent one – or, more pre-
cisely, he did not try to depict his decisions and 
choices as consistent, because he experienced 
confusion that he could not, or would not, ration-
alise and explain away. Unlike M.S., who was firm 
in his stance of a righteous struggle by all means 
necessary, M. could not  feel joy in seeing his en-
emy defeated when he realised what that meant in 
practice. He could not resist the temptation to see 
his enemies as fellow human beings.
It can take a lot of strength and integrity not 
to follow the escalation of polarisation and moral 
anger, »to maintain one’s humanity« as those who 
were against escalation and bloodshed in the sum-
mer of 2013 put it (Youssef 2013). But in a time 
when so much emotional and ethical work is in-
vested in creating and maintaining enmity, weak-
ness can also become a virtue. Being a coward 
can rescue one from the destructive stand-off of 
fearless confrontation (see Shehata 2013b). Temp-
tation can become the change of creating a crack 
in the carefully crafted wall of an absolute good-
evil binary. The sense of irbak – bewilderment, 
confusion, and loss of solid ground – can become 
an antithesis to fiercely cultivated determination 
and oblivion. These sentiments came too late to 
prevent the bloodshed. But maybe they can show a 
way out from the deadlock of certainties.
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